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This paper brings empirical evidence to the relationship among product innovation, market structure 
and appropriablility at firm level in Brazilian manufacturing. Our data base to 2003 and 2005 alows 
build a short unbalanced panel with 16.000 firms and use 10 appropriability mechanisms, since the 
traditional patents of invention to industrial secret and advertisement. We also consider a mix of 
appropriability mechanisms and distinguish product innovation to the firm and to the market. As we 
know, this is the first empirical study in this field to Brazil and some of the few at firm level in the 
literature.  
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Apresentamos evidências empíricas para a relação entre inovação em produto, estrutura de mercado 
e apropriabilidade para empresas da indústria brasileira de transformação a partir de um painel curto 
e desbalanceado para 2003 e 2005 com 16.000 firmas e 10 mecanismos de apropriabiliadade, que 
vão  desde  as  tradicionais  patentes  de  invenção  até  segredo  industrial  e  propaganda.  Também 
consideramos um mix de mecanismo de apropriabiliade e distiguimos entre inovação em produto 
para a firma e para o mercado. Até onde sabemos, este é o primeiro estudo empírico desta natureza 
para o Brasil e um dos poucos para firmas na literatura.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between innovation and market structure began with the Schumpterian hypotheses, 
which has two versions: 1) innovation increases more than proportionately with firm size and 2) 
innovation increases with market.  
 
This  discussion  is  probably  one  of  the  most  extensively  and  intensively  explored  subjects  in 
industrial  organization.  However,  the  empirical  IO  literature  traditionally  analyses  R&D-market 
structure at industry level, and disaggregation varying from 2 to 5 SIC digit.  And those studies use 
patents of invention as Scherer (1965) or appropriability indicators as Cohen, Levin and Mowery 
(1985). Most empirical studies failed in take systematic account of more fundamental sources of 
variation in the innovative behavior and performance of firms and industries.  
 
In  fact,  innovation  effort  is  traditionally  measured  as  R&D  expendures,  basically  because  of 
technical difficulties to measure innovation. It focuses on the input of the innovation process (R&D) 
rather than the output (process or product innovation), as Cohen and Levin (1989) remark in their 
critical survey about innovation and market structure. However, there are significative objections to 
expendures on R&D as proxy to innovation. Geroski (1990) empirical study to innovation-market 
strucuture in UK industries is one remarkable exception; in spite he doesn’t distinguish process and 
product innovation.  
 
This paper brings empirical evidence to the relationship among product innovation, market structure 
and appropriablility at firm level in Brazilian manufacturing. We use 10 appropriability mechanisms, 
since the traditional patents of invention to industrial secret and advertisement. We also consider a 
mix of appropriability mechanisms and distinguish product innovation to the firm and to the market. 
It allows us take systematic account of more fundamental sources of variation in the innovative 
behavior and performance of firms and industries using firm level appropriability mechanisms. It is 
possible thanks to two detailed surveys conducted by Brazilian Census Office (IBGE) in 2003 and 
2005: one about Brazilian industry, the Industry Annual Survey (PIA), and other about industry 
innovation, the Technological Innovation Survey (PINTEC).  
 
Our main results are: 
 
•  Only  one  appropriability  mechanism  has  always  negative  impact  on  product  innovation 
decision (the opposite we expected), no matter if product innovation to the firm or to the 
market. As those appropriability methods have negative impact on firm’s product innovation 
to the firm decision, it means those writing or strategic appropriability methods alone have 
low appropriabily effect.  
•  Our results also suggest  that advertisement  and a mix of appropriability methods are far 
efficient as product innovation to the firm protection option than only one writing or strategic 
appropriability mechanism. It makes sense once ad has an information split effect and a mix 
of appropriability options has a protection innovation effect far bigger than only one writing 
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•  Market  share  and  it square  doesn’t  have  effect on  firm’s  product  innovation to  the  firm 
decision.  
•  Quite  interesting,  here  market  share  and  it  interaction  with  only  one  appropriability 
mechanism  have  positive  effect  on  firm’s  product  innovation  to  the  market  decision,  no 
matter  it  is  writing  or  strategic.  And  market  share  square,  negative impact,  suggesting  a 
conditional non-linearity. It makes sense as product innovation to the market is stronger than 
to the firm and certainly needs more protection 
 
As we know, this is the first empirical study in this field to Brazil and some of the few at firm level 
in the literature.  
 
This paper has 4 sections further than this introduction: section 2 reviews empirical analysis about 
innovation, market structure and appropriability, stressing the evolution of the empirical literature 
and  patents  and  R&D  limits;  section  3  shows  our  econometric  models;  section  4,  results  and 
interpretations; and section 5, conclusions. 
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2.  EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS  ABOUT  INNOVATION,  MARKET  STRUCTURE  AND 
APPROPRIABILITY  
 
2.1 Empirical literature 
 
The relationship between innovation and market structure began with the Schumpterian hypotheses, 
which has two versions: 1) innovation increases more than proportionately with firm size and 2) 
innovation  increases  with  market  concentration.  This  discussion  is  probably  one  of  the  most 
extensively and intensively explored subjects in industrial organization. As the goal of this paper is 
bring  empirical  evidence  to  the  relationship  among  product  innovation,  market  structure  and 
appropriablility at firm level in Brazilian manufacturing, we should revise this subject.  
 
The  empirical  IO  literature  traditionally  analyses  R&D-market  structure  at  industry  level,  and 
disaggregation varying from 2 to 5 SIC digit.  And those studies use patents of invention as Scherer 
(1965) or appropriability indicators as Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1985). An exception is Geroski 
(1990).  
 
Scherer (1965) paper about “firm size, market structure, opportunity, and the output of patented 
inventions”  is  very  influential  and  creative  but  also  a  good  example  of  data and  computational 
restrictions, not easily shifted until 1980’s. 
 
In spite Scherer’s restrictions, his seminal methodology should be remarked. Scherer (1965) had as 
main sample 448 firms on Fortunes list of the 500 largest U.S. industrial corporations for the base 
year 1955. And 352 out of 448 (78%) spent on R&D. The dependent variable is the number of U.S. 
invention patents issued to the sampled firms in 1959. It is lagged because of office registration 
delay. The independent variables were three measures of firm size for 1955, profits for 1955 through 
1960, liquid assets for 1955, an index of diversification, dummy variables differentiating industry 
and technology classes, and four-firm concentration ratios. 
 
In the 1980’s Cohen, Levin and Mowery (1985) study using data on R&D appropriability collected 
by Levin et al. (1984) in a survey of R&D executives in 130 industries shows we must look to 
underlying differences in appropriability conditions.  
 
This long R&D-market structure relation debate is summarized by Cohen and Levin (1989) in their 
famous survey about empirical studies of innovation and market structure. Their analysis to the 
empirical  evidences  until  1980’s  suggest  that  empirical  results  bearing  on  the  Schumpeterian 
hypotheses  are  inconclusive,  in  larger  part  because  investigators  have  failed  to  take  systematic 
account of more fundamental sources of variation in the innovative behavior and performance of 
firms and industries.   
 
They  also  conclude  that  the  empirical  literature  on  Schumpeter  hypotheses  is  pervaded  by 
methodological difficulties as the data have often been inadequate to analyze the question at hand, 
and the econometric techniques employed were rather primitive. The empirical results concerning 
how firm size and market structure relate to innovation are perhaps most accurately described as 
fragile.  
 
By way of synthesis, evidences about R&D and market structure consists of many diverse and often 
conflicting results, even though the majority of studies have found a positive correlation between 
seller concentration and industry R&D intensity. Several empirical studies show that controlling for Page 5 of  18 
 
variables  representing  industry  differences  in  technological  opportunity,  usually  using  industry 
dummy variables, considerably reduces the effect of seller concentration on industry R&D intensity, 
implying that market structure and technological opportunity are not mutually independent in their 
relationship with industry R&D performance.  
 
Also,  the  conditions  governing  appropriability  of  the  returns  from  innovation  are  among  the 
fundamental determinants of differences in innovation and R&D efforts. In fact, the ability of the 
firms  to  appropriate  the  returns  from  innovation  encourages  R&D  investment.  A  mix  of 
appropriability mechanisms avoids appropriability predation or imperfect appropriability.  
 
Cohen and Levin (1989) also remember us that economists have made relatively little progress in 
specifying  and  quantifying  appropriability  influence  basically  because  the  data  necessary  for 
empirical  work  are  often  unavailable  or  unreliable.  Among  the  remarkable  efforts  to  measure 
appropriability  are  Levin  et  al.  (1987)  with  the  Yale  Survey  and  Cohen  et  al.  (2000)  with  the 
Carnegie Mellon Survey.  
 
Geroski (1990) empirical study about innovations-market strucuture relationhip in the UK industries 
is one of the few exeptions in this Schumpetrian tradition. The data on two 73 three digit industry 
cross-section panels covers the periods 1970-4 and 1975-9, using average values over the five year 
period for the independent variables. He also use qualitative response model.  
 
He explores the correlation between innovativeness and monopoly power by examining the effect of 
rivalry using more information on market structure than just concentration ratios, by correcting for 
interindustry variations in technological opportunity, and by distinguishing the effect that rivalry has 
on innovativeness for a given level of post-innovation returns from the effect that rivalry has on 
innovativeness through its effects on post-innovation returns.  
 
He  found  fairly  strong  evidence  against  the  hypothesis  that  increases  in  competitive  rivalry  decrease 
innovativeness. The calculations revealed that monopoly appears to inhibit the response to a given 
level of post-innovation returns, and that the indirect effects on innovativeness are relatively small. 
There is, in short, almost no support in the data for popular Schumpeterian assertions about the role 
of actual monopoly in stimulating progressiveness. 
 
In  the  next  section  we  show  limits  to  R&D  as  proxy  to  innovation  and  patents  limits  as 
appropriability indicator.  
 
2.2 Patents and R&D limits 
 
At least since Scherer (1965) we know that a straight count of patents has two limitations: (1) the 
propensity to patent an invention of given quality may vary from firm to firm and from industry to 
industry; and (2) the quality of the underlying inventions varies widely from patent to patent.  
 
Nowadays it is clear that not only patents but also others intellectual protection tools have positive 
effects  on  the  economy.  Copyright  laws,  for  example,  incentive  technological  innovation  and 
brought better price discrimination in the US VHS and DVD market (Mortimer, 2007).   
 
In  fact,  intellectual  protection  through  patents  is  not  always  the  best  option  for  many  firms.  It 
motivates Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) try explain why some American companies register 
patents and others not. Analysing data from 1478 R&D labs in the American manufacturing industry 
in 1994, they found that firms protect their innovation profits not only through patents but using a Page 6 of  18 
 
mix of intellectual property mechanisms, which include industrial secret and leading time. Among 
those mechanisms, patents are the fewest used while industrial secret and leading time are the most 
common.  
 
Hall and Ziedonis (2001) agree with Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000): patent is not always the best 
option. In some cases, there is a patent paradox, as illustrate an empirical study about 95 firms 
pattern standard in the US semiconductor industry between 1979 and 1995 – an industry whose main 
characteristic is fast technological change and cumulative innovation. It showed that those firms not 
always use patent to protect their R&D profits - which is a paradox in a high and fast technological 
change sector.  
 
If  patent  sometimes  is  not  the  best  option  in  developed  countries,  patents  data  limitations  in 
developing countries became it not the best source of information about innovation. In general, data 
patents  have  three  important  restrictions:  i)  they  measure  inventions  not  innovation,  ii)  patents 
standard  change  according  to  country,  industry  and  process  and  iii)  companies  frequently  use 
alternative protection tools as industrial secret and leading time (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell, 
2008).  
 
At least, we should remark that besides many formal and informal apropriability mechanisms, as 
patents and designing, advertisement is a protection option sometimes far efficient than formal ones.  
 
In fact, either register an innovation in a patent office or show it to as many potential buyers as 
possible, the second option could be financially better than the first one. And once an innovation is 
associated to a company, competitors will have an extra difficult because more than imitate or create, 
they will need to persuade potential buyers that their products are as good as or better than that 
company which first innovate and ad it.  
 
Advertising may serve as a signal of product quality or R&D effort; or both R&D and advertising are 
strategic investments and thus seem to affect each other. The relationship between advertising, R&D, 
and market structure advertising outlays aimed at increasing perceived quality (Shaked and Sutton, 
1987).  
 
About R&D expenditure, it is not always the best measure to innovative effort (Cohen and Levin, 
1989), particularly in developing countries as Brazil once in those countries not all innovations are 
generated by R&D expenditures, R&D does not necessarily lead to innovation (they are an input 
rather than an output), and formal R&D measures are biased against small firms (Gorodnichenko, 
Svejnar and Terrell, 2008). 
 
Using R&D expenditures may also be inappropriate because not all innovations are generated by 
R&D expenditures, R&D does not necessarily lead to innovation (they are an input rather than an 
output), and formal R&D measures are biased against small firms. Perhaps most important for the 
purposes of this paper is the fact that in emerging market economies these types of innovations are 
less likely to be observed as firms are expected to engage more in imitation and adaptation of already 
created and tested innovations, rather than in generating new inventions and are less likely to expend 
resources on R&D (Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell, 2008).  
 
In  fact,  innovation  effort  is  measured  by  expendures  on  R&D,  basically  because  of  technical 
difficulties to measure innovation. It focuses on the input of the innovation process (R&D) rather 
than the output (process or product innovation), as Cohen and Levin (1989) remark.  
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In fact, it is heroic to assume that a properly measure R&D expenditure can fully summarize a firm’s 
innovation effort. Moreover, many small firms simply have no formal R&D operation; and effort 
devoted to technological innovation is typically an unmeasured fraction of the time worked by the 
firm’s engineers and managers. At least, in most studies doesn’t distinguish process and product 
innovation.  
 
In this study we consider direct measures to product innovation and a set of writing and strategic 
appropriability mechanisms and a mix of them inclusive advertisement. As far we know it covers a 
lack of empirical studies in the literature.  
 
2.3 Empirical studies to Brazilian industry  
 
Empirical studies about innovation in the Brazilian industrial firms could be grouped in two sets: 
before and after PINTEC (see details about this survey in the next section). Before PINTEC, those 
studies used R&D as proxy to innovation, following a long tradition. Among the main results, a 
negative relationship between R&D intensity and firm size for the years 1993 and 1994 (Hasenclever 
e Resende, 1998); R&D effort elasticity is size firm invariant (Macedo e Alburquerque, 1999); and 
concentration and advertisement expenditures are correlated (Resende, 2006). 
 
After PINTEC, a set of empirical papers analyse the relationship among innovations, technological 
patterns  and  performance  in  the  Brazilian  industrial  companies  (De  Negri  e  Salerno,  2005); 
technology,  exports  and  employment  (De  Negri,  De  Negri  e  Coelho,  2006)  and  technological 
innovation in Brazilian and Argentine firms (De Negri e Truchi, 2007). In sum, they show that 
innovative firms with differentiated products have the biggest market share; innovative effort among 
Brazilian firms is higher than foreign ones in Brazil; Brazilian exports have technological intensity 
lower than world average; and that Brazilian firms have a technological performance better than 
Argentinean ones.  However, those results are not enough. Innovative performance should increase 
and the global scenario gives Brazilian industry two options: innovation or innovation (Arbix, 2007)  
 
In sipte many important empirical studies about innovation in the Brazilian industry, as far we know 
it  is  the  first  one  that  considers  the  relationship  among  product  innovation,  market  share  and 
appropriability in a broad sense.  
 
Before we go ahead, let’s give details about the data base and variables.  
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3.  DATA BASE AND VARIABLES 
 
Our  data  base  are  the  Industrial  Annual  Survey  (Pesquisa  Industrial  Anual,  PIA)  and  the 
Technological Innovation Survey (Pesquisa de Inovação Tecnológica, PINTEC), both produced by 
Brazilian Census Office (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, IBGE).  
 
PIA is a firm level industrial annual survey to Brazilian manufacturing. It began in 1966 and change 
completely  in  1996  to  be  according  to  modern  survey  technology.    It  is  drawn  according  to 
concentration industrial. All industrial firms with more than 30 employees are in this survey. As 
smaller firms are the majority in number but the minority in economic activity, PIA has a sample to 
industrial firms with more than 5 and less than 30 employees. From PIA we get annual information 
about advertisement expenditure, net revenue, inventories, payroll, and operational costs.  
 
Those  information  allow  us  calculate  at  firm  level  market  share  as  MSit=  firm  i  at  year  t 
revenue/sector revenue at year t, where sector is SIC 4 digit disaggregation level; price cost margin 
as    PCMit=(net  revenueit  +   inventoriesit  –  payrollit  –  operational  costsit)/(net  revenueit 
+ inventoriesit),  as  suggested  by  Domowitz,  Hubbart  and  Petersen  (1986);  and  advertisement 
intensity as ADVit = advertisement expenditureit /net revenueit. 
 
PINTEC is a firm level technological innovation survey that began in 2000 following Oslo Manual 
3
rd edition methodology. It is not annual and has until now three editions available: 2000, 2003 and 
2005.  However,  only  the  second  and  third  editions  have  information  about  appropriability 
mechanisms. So we focus on 2003 and 2005 surveys.  
 
From PINTEC we get annual information about product innovation (to the firm or to the market) and 
if the firm use (or not) at least one of the following protection mechanisms: patents of invention (PI), 
utility model patent (UMP), industry design register (IDR), trade marks (TM) and copyright (C) 
(those 5 are writing appropriability mechanisms), design complexity (DC), industrial secret (IS) an 
leading time to competitors (LTC) (those three are strategic protection mechanisms). This data base 
also has “others” appropriability mechanism category. It allows us build indicator variables about 
R&D activity and use of protection mechanisms.  
 
It is important remark that we have a direct measure of appropriability at firm level from PINTEC. 
As acknowledged by Cockburn and Griliches (1987), despite the richness of some surveys as the 
Yale Survey, it is not easy to derive a single measure of innovation appropriability.  
 
PIA and PINTEC are connectable through a common firm identification number. However, as they 
are surveys, some firms in the PIA are not necessarily in the PINTEC and vice-versa. We match PIA 
and PINTEC 2003 and 2005 editions and get a short unbalanced panel with 16.000 firms. 
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4.  ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
 
As or innovation produt dependent variable is a binary one, we must use a binary response model. 
Probit is the binary response models most commonly used in applications. It is typically estimated by 
maximum likelihood which has good properties in large samples. In particular, it is asymptotically 
efficient (Horowitz and Savin, 2001).  
 
Generally, a probit model can specified as  
 
(1) P(Y=1|X) = G(Xβk) = G(β0 + β1X1+ (…) +βkXk), where G(.) is a normal cdf.   
 
The βk gives the signs of the partial effect of each xk on the response probability; and the statistical 
significance of xk is determined by whether we can reject H0: βk =0. In sum, the signing of βk 
determines whether the independent variables had a positive or negative effect on the binary depend 
one (Wooldridge, 2002).  
 
However, there is neglected heterogeneity problem. The consequences of omitting variables when 
those variables are independent of the included explanatory variables are bias and inconsistence 
coefficients estimation. The omitted variables set could have many variables as management ability, 
technological opportunity and feeling to innovation. The fixed effects probit analysis treats fixed 
effects as parameters to be estimated along with β. And treat fixed effects as parameters to estimate 
lead to potentially serious biases. But it doesn’t happen if we consider random effects (Wooldridge, 
2002).  
 
In the general form our specification is   
 
(2) P(I=1|MS, LNPCMit-1, LNPCMit-2,AI) = G(Xαk) = G(α0 + α1MSit + α2MS
2
it + α3LNPCMit-1 + 
α4LNPCMit-2 + α5MSit*AIit+ α6MS
2
it*AIit + α7AIit) 
 
This can be re-written as  
 
(3)  Iit = α0 + α1MSit + α2MS
2
it + α3LNPCMit-1 + α4LNPCMit-2 + α5MSit*AIit+ α6MS
2
it*AIit + 
α7AIit+ Γit + εit , where: 
 
Iit is a dummy variable to firm i at time t, which is 1 if firms had product innovation (to the firm or to 
the market) and 0 on the contrary. 
 
MSit is market share
2, MS
2
it market share square, LNPCMit-1 and LNPCMit-2 are the first and second 
price-cost margin log lagged, AIit is one of the ten appropriability mechanisms described in section 3 
used alone or mixed, MSit*AIit is the market share-appropriability indicator interaction, MS
2
it*AIit is 
the market share square-appropriability indicator interaction.  
 
AIit allows us control for systematic firm differences in appropriability on product innovation firm 
decision.  MSit*AIit tell us if market structure and appropriability are (or not) mutually independent 
in  their relationship with  industry product innovation  performance, i.e.,  it  controls market share 
effects on product innovation firm decision for systematic firm differences in appropriability.  
                                                              
2 It is important remark that market share measure market concentration and firm size at the same time.   
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The tension between the often-cited inverted-U hypothesis and the diverse empirical results indicates 
that the available empirical evidence is inconclusive, and thus much remains to be learned regarding 
the  relationship  between  market  structure  and  industry  innovative  performance.  MS
2
it  provide 
support for the inverted-U hypothesis. And MS
2
it*AIit it allows us check if appropriability strategy 
influence  inverted-U  relationship.  At  least,  Γit  is  the  firm  random  effect  and  avoid  neglected 
heterogeneity problem.  
 
We expect that α1, α3, α4, α5, α7 have positive sign as market share, lagged profit and appropriability 
mechanisms should have positive effect on product innovation decision. And we expect that α2 and 
α6 could be positive or negative as is possible a U or U-inverted market share-product innovation 
relationship are possible.  
 
At  least,  those  panel  regressions  with  lagged  variables  avoids  endogenity  problem,  especially 
because of simultaneity between product innovation and profitability.  
 
5.  RESULTS 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
TABLE 1, which sould be read through collums, give us some information about firm’s innovative 
profile, our dependet variable. Around 21% of the firms in our sample have done product innovation 
to the firm (IP1), and just 4.5% to the market (IP2).  
 
TABLE 1 - product innovation share  
PRODUCT INNOVATIVE 
PROFILE (%) 
IP1  IP2       
YES  21.13  4.57       
NO  78.87  95.43       
TOTAL  100  100       
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
 
Let’s check the descriptive statistics to our explicative variables.  
 
The continuous variables (TABLES 2 and 3, that should be read through lines) show us that among 
16626 firms Market Share (MS) average is 0.9%, with standard deviation 3.9% and 75
th percentile 
1.4%. Price cost-margin (PCM) average is 64%, with median 71%, standard deviation 23.7% and 
percentiles 5
th 23% and 75
th 82%. At least, the advertisement/net revenue ratio (ADV) average is 
0.3%, median 0.02%, standard deviation 1.2% and 75
th percentile 0.3%. 
 
To sum up, those descriptive statistics show us that market share is lower than 1.5% for at least 75% 
of the firms in this sample, and at least 50% of them have price cost-margin bigger than 71%. They 
also show us a significant dispersion of all variables described.  
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TABLE 2 – continuous variables descriptive statistics  
 
Variable  Observations  Average  Standard Deviation 
MS  16626  0.009  0.041 
MS
2  16626  0.0018  0.023 
PCM  16626  0.64  0.237 
ADV  16626  0.003  0.012 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
 
TABELA 3 – continuous variables percetiles  
Variable  P5  P25  P50  P75  P95 
MS  0.0001  0.0007  0.0034  0.014  0.11 
MS
2  0  0  0  0.0002  0.012 
PCM  0.23  0.57  0.71  0.82  0.93 
ADV  0  0  0.0002  0.003  0.028 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
 
Let`s have a look on discrete variables frequencies. TABLE 4, that should be read through columns,  
show us that among the five writing protection mechanisms, patents of invention (PI) was used by 
6.22% of the firms in our sample, utility model patent (UMP) by 5.47%, industry design register 
(IDR)  by  4.98%,  trade  marks  (TM)  by  22.97%  and  copyright  (C)  by  2.44%.  Among  the  three 
strategic protection mechanisms, design complexity (DC) was used by 2.59% of the firms in our 
sample,  industrial  secret  (IS)  by  10%  and  leading  time  to  competitors  (LTC)  by  5.74%.  Other 
appropriability mechanisms, which each firm specify, by 2.8%.  
 
A firm can, at the same time, register a patent, has a design complex and expend on advertisement. 
So it makes sense consider a mix of appropriability methods (MAM). We create MAM qualitative 
variable  that  is  one  to  firms  that  used  more  than  one  appropiability  mechanism,  include 
advertisement  and  0  on  the  contrary.  By  49.74%  of  the  firms  in  this  sample  used  a  mix  of 
appropriability methods (MAM). 
 
TABLE 4 – firms that used appropriability protection mechanisms  
 
 (%)  PI  UMP  IDR  TM  C  DC  IS  LTC  others  MAM   
Yes  6.22  5.47  4.98  22.97    2.44  2.59  9.99  5.74  2.80  49.74 
No  93.78  94.53  95.02  77.03  97.56  97.41  90.01  94.26  97.20  50.26 
Total  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Source: Our tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys  
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5.2 Regressions results  
 
Tables 4 and 5 have the probit regression results.  
 
Table 4 have results to 11 regressions like equation (3) to process innovation to the firm. In general, 
we have two patterns: t-2 lagged profit has always positive impact on product innovation decision (as 
expected) and only one appropriability mechanism has always negative impact on product innovation 
decision (the opposite we expected). Market share and it square doesn’t have effect on firm’s product 
innovation decision to the firm.The exception is maket share negative effect on product innovation 
decision to the firm if industry design register (IDR) is the only one appropriability mechanism. 
Market share and it squares interactions with appropriability have any effect on product innovation.  
 
As those appropriability methods have negative impact on firm’s product innovation to the firm 
decision, it means those writing or strategic appropriability methods alone have low appropriabily 
effect.  
 
Advertisement as the only appropriability mechanism option has positive effect on on firm’s product 
innovation to the firm decision, which suggests it is a protection option more efficient than only one 
writing or strategic. As Shaked and Sutton (1987) suggest, advertising is as a signal of product 
quality or innovative effort; or both. If fact, advertising and innovation are strategic investments and 
one affect each other. Firms with high ad investment can increase their market share.  
 
At least, we consider a firm use a mix of appropriability methods (MAM). It has positive effect on 
product inoovation to he firm decision, which suggests it is a protection option more efficient than 
only one writing or strategic and at least as efficient as advertisement.  
 
Interestingly, when we consider advertisement as the only firm’s product innovation to the firm 
option or MAM market share has positive effect on innovative decision. As those appropriability 
methods have positive impact on innovation decision, it means ad alone and mix of appropriability 
methods have high appropriabily effect.  
 
Those results also suggest that advertisement and a mix of appropriability methods are far efficient 
as product innovation to the firm protection option than only one writing or strategic appropriability 
mechanism. It makes sense once ad has an information split effect and a mix of appropriability 
options has a protection innovation effect far bigger than only one writing or strategic alternative.   
 
In ad and MAM regressions t-1 and t-2 lagged profit have positive effect on innovation decision as 
well market share.  
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Table 4: Product innovation to the firm, appropriability and market share - 2003- 2005 probit painel 
IP1  PI  UMP  IDR  TM  C  DC  IS  LTC  OTHERS  LNADV  MAM 
CONSTANT  0.25(0.16)  0.78(0.17)***  0.99(0.189)***  0.70(0.096)***  0.057(0.26)  0.29(0.26)  0.44(0.134)***  -0.065(0.178)  0.12(0.269)  0.06(0.086)  -1.52(0.056)*** 
MS  -0.10(2.19)  -1.95(2.58)   -5.08(3.02)*  0.106(1.67)  -1.87(3.16)  0.67(3.56)  -0.697(1.84)  1.054(2.34)  -0.065(4.95)  2.93(1.70)*  5.99(2.31)* 
MS
2  2.86(3.57)  2.89(4.31)   8.51(5.67)  2.41(2.87)  4.45(4.80)  -1.56(6.22)  1.34(2.93)  -0.737(4.00)  1.64(10.71)  -1.81(3.29)  -10.33(7.01) 
LNMPCt-1  0.10(0.089)  0.11(0.088)  0.10(0.088)  0.084(0.088)  0 .11(0.089)  0.11(0.089)  0.10(0.089)  0.11(0.089)  0.11(0.089)  0.35(0.10)***  0.27(0.071)*** 
LNMPCt-2  0.26(0.085)***   0.26(0.085)***  0.26(0.085)***  0.234(0.084)***  0.265(0.085)***  0.265(0.085)***  0.26(0.085)***  0.27(0.086)***  0.267(0.085)***  0.387(0.109)***  0.237(0.071)*** 
MS*AI  0.79(1.22)  1.68(1.37)  3.30(1.57)**  0.607(1.07)   1.78(1.64)  0.37(1.83)  1.04(1.07)  0.224(1.267)  0.76(2.507)  -0.23(0.28)  -1.37(2.35) 
MS
2*AI  -2.89(2.03)  -2.50(2.28)  -5.36(2.92)*  -3.04(2.02)  -3.51(2.52)  -0.20(3.19)  -1.86(1.78)  -0.74(2.16)  -1.85(5.40)  0.63(0.56)  4.62(7.06) 
AI  -0.16(0.084)**  -0.44(0.09)***  -0.55(0.096)***  -0.455(0.053)***  -0.065(0.13)  -0.18(0.131)  -0.271(0.070)***  -0.0016(0.09)  -0.09(0.135)  0.10(0.012)***  0.86(0.048)*** 
LOG VERO  -5419.96  -5410.81  -5406.01  -5368.36  -5424.36  -5424.08  -5415.89  -5425.31  -5425.10  -5423.05  -7512.52 
TEST χ
2                        
All variables   χ2 (7)=49.45***  χ2 (7)=67.60***  χ2 (7)=74.87***  χ2 (7)=140.31***  χ2 (7)=41.58***  χ2 (7)=42.18***  χ2 (7)=57.47***  χ2 (7)=39.83***  χ2 (7)=40.24***  χ2 (7)=248.18***  χ2 (7)=618.56*** 
MS,MS
2  χ2 (2)=3.36  χ2 (2)=0.57  χ2 (2)=2.83  χ2 (2)=3.74  χ2 (2)=1.21  χ2 (2)=0.08  χ2 (2)=0.21  χ2 (2)=0.54  χ2 (2)=0.15  χ2 (2)=7.30  χ2 (2)=8.43 
MS*IA,MS
2*IA  χ2 (2)=4.12  χ2 (2)=1.49  χ2 (2)=4.43  χ2 (2)=4.78*  χ2 (2)=2.09  χ2 (2)=0.14  χ2 (2)=1.09  χ2 (2)=0.23  χ2 (2)=0.12  χ2 (2)=1.36  χ2 (2)=0.43 
MS*IA,MS
2*IA,IA  χ2 (3)=10.62***  χ2 (3)=28.86***  χ2 (3)=36.75***  χ2 (3)=106.38***  χ2 (3)=2.10  χ2 (3)=2.67  χ2 (3)=18.82***  χ2 (3)=0.23  χ2 (3)=0.65  χ2 (3)=98.26***  χ2 (3)=358.06*** 
OBSERVATIONS  8073  8073  8072  8073  8073  8073  8073  8073  8073  9276  14379 
 
Source: Own tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys              
***,**,* means  1%,5% and 10% significance level, respectively  
Note: IP1 is product innovation to the firm  dummy variable (1 if firm spent on R&D, 0 on the contrary),  MS is market share, MS
2 is market share square, LNPCM1, LNPCM2 is price cost margin log lag 1 and 2, MS*IA is market share- appropriability indicator 
interaction, MS
2*IA is market share squared- appropriability indicator interaction. PI is patent of invention dummy (1 if firm had patent of invention, zero on the contrary), UMP is utility model patent dummy , IDR is industry design register dummy, TM is trade 
market dummy, C is copyright dummy, DC is design complexity dummy, IS is industrial secret dummy, LTC is a leading time to competitors dummy, “others” is other appropriability machanisms used by the firms dummy, lnadv is advertisement/net revenue ratio log, 
and MAM is a mix of appropriability mechanisms dummy variable, which includes advertisement (it is one of a firm used one or more appropriability mechanism, inclusive ad, and zero on the contrary).  
 
 
 Page 14 of  18 
 
 
Table 5 have results to 11 regressions like equation (3) above to firm’s product innovation to the 
market decision.Here the results are more interesting.  
 
Again, we have two patterns: t-2 lagged profit has positive impact on product innovation decision (as 
expected, except to  ad regression) and  only one appropriability  mechanism  has always  negative 
impact on product innovation decision (the opposite we expected). As those appropriability methods 
have negative impact on firm’s product innovation to the firm decision, it means those writing or 
strategic appropriability methods alone have low appropriabily effect.  
 
Market share and it square doesn’t have effect on firm’s product innovation to the market decision, 
except if trade market is the only one appropriability option. In this TM regression, MS have positive 
effect and it square negative, i.e., there is a non-linear relationship between innovation and market 
share if trade market is the appropriability mechanism.  
 
Quite interesting, here market share and it interaction with only one appropriability mechanism have 
posite effect on firm’s product innovation to the market decision, no matter it is writing or strategic. 
And market share square, negative impact, suggesting a conditional non-linearity. It makes sense as 
product innovation to the market is stronger than to the firm and certainly needs more protection.  
 
Advertisement as the only appropriability mechanism option has positive effect on firm’s product 
innovation to the market decision, which suggests it is a protection option more efficient than only 
one writing or strategic. Market share have positive effect and there is non-linearity innovation-
market share relation as MS
2 has negative impact on product innovation to the market decision. 
Market share and it square interactions with other appropriability machanisms (MS*ad and MS
2*ad) 
has the oposite MS and MS
2 sign, i.e., advertisement dominates market share effect.  As Shaked and 
Sutton (1987) suggest, advertising is as a signal of product quality or innovative effort; or both. If 
fact, advertising and innovation are strategic investments and one affect each other. Firms with high 
ad investment can increase their market share.  
 
At least, we consider a firm use a mix of appropriability methods (MAM), and the result is basically 
the  same  ad  regression.  As  those  appropriability  methods  have  positive  impact  on  innovative 
decision, it means ad alone and mix of appropriability methods have high appropriabily effect. In 
those cases market share is more largely influenced by the level of technological competence.  
 
Those results also suggests that advertisement and a mix of appropriability methods are far efficient 
as  product  to  the  market  innovation  protection  option  than  only  one  writing  or  strategic 
appropriability mechanism. It makes sense once ad has an information split effect and a mix of 
appropriability  options  has  an  innovation  protection  effect  far  bigger  than  only  one  writing  or 
strategic alternative.   
 




Table 5: Product innovation to the market, appropriability and market share - 2003- 2005 probit painel 
IP2  PI  UMP  IDR  TM  C  DC  IS  LTC  OTHERS  LNADV  MAM 
CONSTANT  0.95(0.16)  0.35(0.18)**  -0.012(0.197)  -0.482(0.106)***  -0.11(0.278)  0.55(0.262)**  0.43(0.135)***  1.28(0.175)***  -0.068(0.28)  -1.02(0.107)***  -2.98(0.10)*** 
MS  -1.17(2.20)   1.96(2.61)  0.457(3.42)  9.28(1.67)***  3.46(3.37)  2.27(3.96)  2.71(1.88)  0.877(2.35)  9.95(5.11)*  6.71(1.63)***  26.39(5.46)*** 
MS
2  4.61(3.69)  -0.096(4.52)  6.72(7.620  -8.43(2.72)***  0.615(5.46)  2.27(7.86)  2.66(3.16)  -0.798(4.03)  -14.59(10.89)  -5.83(2.74)**  -102.5(33.76)*** 
LNMPCt-1  0.12(0.12)  0.156(0.12)  0.148(0.117)  0.109(0.115)  0.15(0.116)  0.15(0.117)  0.106(0.12)  0.16(0.119)  0.15(0.11)  0.32(0.14)**  0.17(0.10)* 
LNMPCt-2  0.23(0.11)**   0.23(0.11)**  0.22(0.114)**  0.185(0.112)*  0.22(0.113)**  0.22(0.114)**  0.204(0.11)*  0.24(0.116)**  0.226(0.11)**  0.097(0.13)  0.24(0.108)** 
MS*AI  5.46(1.22)***  3.98(1.39)***  4.78(1.77)***  -0.115(1.04)  3.25(1.74)*   3.70(2.02)*  3.54(1.13)***  3.99(1.27)***  -0.105(2.59)  -0.62(0.26)**  -16.02(5.47)*** 
MS
2*AI  -7.37(2.06)***  -4.88(2.38)**  -8.36(3.88)**  -0.40(1.76)  -5.40(2.84)*  -5.91(3.99)  -7.29(2.016)***  -3.82(2.177)*  2.55(5.49)  0.75(0.42)**  92.16(33.76)*** 
AI  -1.30(0.086)***  -0.97(0.09)***   -0.78(0.10)***  -0.625(0.06)***  -0.72(0.14)***  -1.05(0.132)***  -1.05(0.073)***  -1.45(0.092)***  -0.74(0.14)***  0.13(0.015)***   1.24(0.09)*** 
LOG VERO  -3177.93  -3253.05  -3280.54  -3233.35  -3300.31  -3275.27  -3169.73  -3145.97  -3294.35  -3068.99  -3756.33 
TEST χ
2                        
All variables   χ2 (7)=633.81***  χ2 (7)=541.24***  χ2 (7)=498.58***  χ2 (7)=558.77***  χ2 (7)=471.57***  χ2 (7)=507.64***  χ2 (7)=638.76***  χ2 (7)=675.15***  χ2 (7)=482.98***  χ2 (7)=562.82***  χ2 (7)=833.55*** 
MS,MS
2  χ2 (2)=3.63  χ2 (2)=2.82  χ2 (2)=5.53*  χ2 (2)=47.19***  χ2 (2)=6.97**  χ2 (2)=4.26**  χ2 (2)=24.56***  χ2 (2)=0.28  χ2 (2)=5.24*  χ2 (2)=27.53  χ2 (2)=38.95*** 
MS*IA,MS
2*IA  χ2 (2)=21.05***  χ2 (2)=9.70***  χ2 (2)=7.74**  χ2 (2)=0.52  χ2 (2)=3.74  χ2 (2)=3.52  χ2 (2)=13.12***  χ2 (2)=17.31***  χ2 (2)=1.24  χ2 (2)=6.28**  χ2 (2)=8.58** 
MS*IA,MS
2*IA,IA  χ2 (3)=269.99***  χ2 (3)=129.02***  χ2 (3)=69.82***  χ2 (3)=163.88***  χ2 (3)=32.98***  χ2 (3)=84.06***  χ2 (3)=285.86***  χ2 (3)=324.18***  χ2 (3)=45.95***  χ2 (3)=76.57***  χ2 (3)=223.66*** 
OBSERVATIONS  8073  8073  8072  8073  8073  8073  8073  8073  8073  9276  14379 
 
Source: Own tabulation from 2003 and 2005 PIA and PINTEC surveys              
***,**,* means  1%,5% and 10% significance level, respectively  
Note: IP2 is product innovation to the market  dummy variable (1 if firm spent on R&D, 0 on the contrary),  MS is market share, MS
2 is market share square, LNPCM1, LNPCM2 is price cost margin log lag 1 and 2, MS*IA is market share- appropriability indicator 
interaction, MS
2*IA is market share squared- appropriability indicator interaction. PI is patent of invention dummy (1 if firm had patent of invention, zero on the contrary), UMP is utility model patent dummy , IDR is industry design register dummy, TM is trade 
market dummy, C is copyright dummy, DC is design complexity dummy, IS is industrial secret dummy, LTC is a leading time to competitors dummy, “others” is other appropriability machanisms used by the firms dummy, lnadv is advertisement/net revenue ratio log, 
and MAM is a mix of appropriability mechanisms dummy variable, which includes advertisement (it is one of a firm used one or more appropriability mechanism, inclusive ad, and zero on the contrary).  
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6.  CONCLUSION 
 
By  way  of  synthesis,  the  relationship  between  product  innovation  (to  the  firm  or  to  the 
market) and market structure (conditional to appropriability) among Brazilian manufacturing 
firm’s empirical evidence to 2003 and 2005 unbalanced panel suggest that:  
 
Our main results are: 
 
•  Only  one  appropriability  mechanism  has  always  negative  impact  on  product 
innovation decision (the opposite we expected), no matter if product innovation to the 
firm  or  to  the  market. As  those appropriability  methods  have  negative  impact  on 
firm’s product innovation to the firm decision, it means those writing or strategic 
appropriability methods alone have low appropriabily effect.  
•  Our results also suggest that advertisement and a mix of appropriability methods are 
far efficient as product innovation to the firm protection option than only one writing 
or strategic appropriability mechanism. It makes sense once ad has an information 
split effect and a mix of appropriability options has a protection innovation effect far 




•  Market share and it square doesn’t have effect on firm’s product innovation to the 
firm decision.  
•  Quite interesting, here market share and it interaction with only one appropriability 
mechanism have positive effect on firm’s product innovation to the market decision, 
no  matter  it  is  writing  or  strategic.  And  market  share  square,  negative  impact, 
suggesting a conditional non-linearity. It makes sense as product innovation to the 
market is stronger than to the firm and certainly needs more protection 
 
Our results about product innovation and market structure (conditional to appropriability) is 
not only are according to the debate about this subject but also bring some contributions. In 
fact, most of the literature is about R&D and market structure, not about innovation and 
market structure.  
 
In this study we consider direct measures to product innovation and a set of writing and 
strategic appropriability mechanisms and a mix of them inclusive advertisement. As far we 
know it this is the first empirical study in this field to Brazil and some of the few at firm level 
in the literature. It also covers a lack of empirical studies in the literature.  
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